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 Abstract: One of crucial issue in Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, is relation between religion and the state. 
Even though Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were claimed final, but it did not necessarily mean that position 
of religion, state and human rights is final and clear. The negotiation between religion, state and human rights 
not only on political forum like at The House of Representative, but also in Constitutional Court session. There are 
debates and opinion contestations. The problem is what is the politics of law accommodation towards religious 
aspirations, which the Constitutional Court has built through its decisions and arguments? Through analysis on 
two issues: 1) freedom of religion and belief; and 2) marriage law, this article argues that Constitutional Court’s 
decision, especially relation between religion, state and human rights not only based on law consideration, but also 
on non-law consideration. Regarding private law, the Constitutional Court opened a fairly wide accommodation, 
so that more religious aspects would be accommodated by the state even with limited reforms. The limit of 
accommodation is an Islamic criminal law that cannot be made exclusively for Muslims. The accommodation 
of Islamic criminal law is only possible if the norms are incorporated into the national criminal law through a 
process of rational objectification. Based on this argument, continuous negotiation and contestation between 
religion, state and human rights will go on since Indonesia is not a religious state, which is based only on one 
religion, nor a secular state, which does not consider religion at all. 
 Keywords: Constitutional Court; Human Rights; beliefs; blasphemy; marriage law.
 Abstrak: Salah satu isu krusial di negara Muslim, tidak terkecuali Indonesia, adalah relasi agama dan negara. 
Meskipun Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dinyatakan final, namun bukan berarti kedudukan agama, 
negara, dan hak asasi manusia sudah final dan jelas. Perundingan antara agama, negara dan hak asasi manusia 
tidak hanya di forum politik seperti di Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPR), tapi juga di sidang Mahkamah Konstitusi. 
Ada perdebatan dan kontestasi pendapat. Persoalannya, bagaimana politik akomodasi hukum terhadap aspirasi 
agama yang dibangun Mahkamah Konstitusi melalui putusan dan dalilnya? Melalui analisis terhadap dua isu: 
1) kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan; dan 2) hukum perkawinan, pasal ini berpendapat bahwa putusan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi khususnya hubungan antara agama, negara dan hak asasi manusia tidak hanya berdasarkan 
pertimbangan hukum, tetapi juga pertimbangan non hukum. Terkait hukum privat, Mahkamah Konstitusi 
membuka akomodasi yang cukup luas, sehingga lebih banyak aspek keagamaan yang diakomodasi oleh negara 
meski dengan reformasi yang terbatas. Batasan akomodasi adalah hukum pidana Islam yang tidak dapat 
dibuat secara eksklusif untuk Muslim. Akomodasi hukum pidana Islam hanya dimungkinkan jika norma-norma 
tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam hukum pidana nasional melalui proses objektifikasi yang rasional. Berdasarkan 
argumen ini, negosiasi dan kontestasi yang terus menerus antara agama, negara dan hak asasi manusia akan 
terus berlangsung karena Indonesia bukanlah negara agama yang hanya didasarkan pada satu agama, bukan 
pula negara sekuler, yang sama sekali tidak mempertimbangkan agama.
 Kata kunci: Mahkamah Konstitusi; HAM; penghayat kepercayaan; penodaan agama; hukum perkawinan.
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 Introduction
The decisions of the Constitutional Court 
related to religious issues are basically an effort 
to organize the position of the state, religion 
and human rights. The issue of the relationship 
between religion and the state has long been a 
political ideological struggle in Indonesia. Since 
the establishment of the state, it has always 
provided space for negotiation and debate. 
The Constitutional Court decision is an official 
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interpretation of the constitution with final and 
binding force. The verdict of the Constitutional 
Court judges not only ends various different 
perspectives on the law and the constitution, 
but also affirms the political direction of law in 
Indonesia.
There are some decisions related to religious 
matters, which can be divided into several 
categories: First, those related to marriage 
issues (al-ahwâl al-syakhsiyyah) as regulated in 
Law no. 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage. In the 
case of marriage, there are several issues that 
are tested for constitutionality, namely the matter 
of regulating polygamy,1 provisions on the legality 
of children born outside of legal marriages,2 
interfaith marriages,3 and restrictions on the age 
of marriage.4
Second, the matter of blasphemy as regulated 
in Law no. 1 / PNPS / 1965. This law has been 
judged twice with different touchstones.5 Third, 
regarding the competence of the Religious Courts 
as in Law no. 3 of 2006 concerning Religious Courts 
related to the implementation of Islamic criminal 
law.6 Fourth, financial and economic arrangements, 
the laws being tested are the Sharia Banking Law 
and the Zakat Management Law.7 Fifth, the status 
1 The verdict No. 12/PUU-V/2007 about examining UU No. 
1 Tahun 1974. The articles in question are article 3 paragraph 
(1) and paragraph (2), article 4 paragraph (1) and (2), article 
5 paragraph (1), article 9, article 15, article 24 related to the 
regulation of polygamy.
2 The verdict No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010 about examining UU No. 
1 Tahun 1974. The articles in question are article 2 paragraph 
(2) and article 43 paragraph (1) related to the legal status of 
children outside of wedlock
3 The verdict No. 68 / PUU-XII / 2014 about examining 
Article 2 paragraph (1) of Law no. 1 of 1974. This article regulates 
the legality of marriage that must be carried out with a partner 
of the mutual religion
4 The verdict No. 30-74 / PUU-XII / 2014 which tested the 
constitutionality of Article 7 paragraph (1) of Law no. 1 of 1974 
concerning Marriage. This article regulates the minimum age 
of marriage for women 16 years old
5 The verdict No. 84 / PUU-X / 2012 regarding the 
examination of the Criminal Code and Judicial Review of Law 
No. 1 / PNPS / 1965 concerning the Prevention of Abuse and/
or Blasphemy of Religion; and verdict No. 140 / PUU-VII / 2009 
regarding the review of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning the 
Prevention of Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion
6 The verdict No. 19 / PUU-VI / 2008 regarding the review of 
Law no. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law no. 3 of 2006 concerning 
Religious Courts. The article in question is article 49 paragraph 
(1) related to the competence of the Religious Courts which 
does not include the implementation of Islamic penalties.
7 The verdict no. 86 / PUU-X / 2012 regarding the review of 
of believers in religious services especially the 
inclusion of the religion column on the identity 
card (KTP).8
The Constitutional Court decisions related to 
these religious issues, in a political perspective, 
can be seen as an official interpretation of the 
constitution on a number of religious issues 
within the framework of the state. The verdict 
of the Constitutional Court judges can end 
various different perspectives on the law and 
the constitution. Although there are parties 
who accept and reject the Constitutional Court’s 
decision, it is the Constitutional Court’s decision 
that is considered the “final word” of various 
differences of opinion on the interpretation of 
the constitution.
These decisions provided constitutional 
guidance on how religious and divine issues 
were managed. This godly state understanding 
has a long history in Indonesia. This is what 
Jeremy Menchik9 calls godly nationalism which 
distinguishes Indonesian nationalism from models 
of nationalism in other countries. Although this 
theory is used by Menchik to see the symptoms 
of intolerance in Indonesia, it is relevant to be 
used as an optic to observe the Constitutional 
Court’s legal decisions. Menchik argued that 
religious intolerance that continues to strengthen 
in Indonesia is partly because the nationalism that 
grows and develops in Indonesia is nationalism 
which from the start has included aspects of 
divinity in it. The Constitutional Court decisions 
related to religious issues cannot be separated 
from the spirit of divine nationalism.
Law no. 23 of 2011 concerning Zakat Management. The articles 
in question are articles 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19 related to the status, 
duties and functions of Baznas; Verdict No. 93 / PUU-X / 2012 
regarding the review of Law no. 1 of 2008 concerning Islamic 
Banking.
8 The Constitutional Court Verdict Number 97 / PUU-XIV / 
2016 related to Law No. No. 23 of 2006 concerning Population 
Administration which has been amended into Law no. 24 of 
2013 related to the religion column for groups of believers. The 
judicial review submitted by groups of believers from various 
regions filed a request for constitutional interpretation of Article 
61 paragraph (2), and canceled Article 61 paragraph (2) and 
Article 64 paragraph (5) of the Population Administration Law.
9 See Jeremy Menchik, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 
Tolerance without Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), pp. 65-92. And see Jeremy Menchik, “Productive 
Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia”, Jurnal Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, (2014), p. 591–621. 
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In Menchik’s view, Godly nationalism contains 
several elements. First, theism, in here all citizens 
are obliged to adhere one of the six valid religions. 
This means that divine nationalism is different 
from religious nationalism, as exists in Israel or 
some Muslim countries, where only one religion 
is considered valid. At the same time, Indonesian 
citizens are not allowed to become atheists and 
campaign for atheism.
Second, for every religion that is recognized 
and considered valid, the state has the right 
to determine which beliefs and practices are 
orthodox or which deserve to be accepted as 
official parts of that religion. The state provides 
protection to the legitimate religion from acts 
deemed insulting to religion. Third, the State really 
considers the opinions of religious organizations 
such as Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), 
Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in 
determining heterodox types of beliefs. Beliefs 
which were considered obsolete and deviant were 
automatically outside the protection of the state. 
The Constitutional Court’s inauguration of Law no. 
1 / PNPS / 1965 concerning Blasphemy of Religion, 
in Menchik’s view, is part of an effort to strengthen 
this divine nationalism.
The strengthening of divine values  in the 
management of the state does not only occur in 
Indonesia, but also develops in various parts of 
the world, this phenomenon by Ran Hirschl on 
Constitutional Theocracy.10 This theory is useful 
for reading the Constitutional Court decisions 
related to religious issues. Constitutionalism is 
a notion that places law and constitution as a 
means of regulating state life.11 This understanding 
is usually distinguished from theocracy, which 
places divinity as the determinant and guide of 
state life. Constitutionalism is in line with the spirit 
of democracy and the rule of law, while theocracy 
is considered to be against democracy because it 
puts sovereignty in God’s hands.
However, in the practice of law in various 
countries, Ran actually saw a symptom where 
10 see Ran Hirschl tentang Constitutional Theocracy, 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 2010.
11 Further understanding of constitutionalism, see Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
Sinar Grafika, 2010).
many countries still adhere to constitutionalism, 
but religion through its figures plays an important 
role in the management of the country. This 
type of state cannot be called a theocratic state, 
because the constitution still plays an important 
role. This constitutional theocracy has developed 
in various countries not only in Muslim-majority 
countries, but also non-Muslim-majority countries.
The question to be answered in this paper is 
what is the direction of the legal politics of state 
accreditation towards religious aspirations, which 
the Constitutional Court is developing through its 
decisions and arguments? This problem will be 
answered by examining a number of Constitutional 
Court decisions related to religious issues which 
are broadly related to two major themes, 1) the 
right to religion and belief, which includes the 
issue of blasphemy, the application of Islamic 
penalties and the position of believers of belief 
in Almighty God; 2). Decisions regard to family 
law which include matters of polygamy, interfaith 
marriage, the status of children born outside of 
legal marriages, and the minimum age of marriage. 
Departing from this, the main problem that this 
paper wants to answer is how the Constitutional 
Court puts human rights issues, especially those 
related to religious rights, in the legal system 
and its implications for the relationship between 
religion and the state. 
Method
The main material that is the source of 
this paper is the Constitutional Court decisions 
which will be reviewed using content analysis as 
a method for text analysis which is commonly 
called qualitative content analysis. This method 
views data not only as a collection of events, but 
also views data as symbolic symptoms. By using 
this method, the authors see the Constitutional 
Court decisions and their arguments by looking 
at the pragmatic content analysis; semantic 
content analysis; and sign-vehicle analysis. With 
this analysis, this deaf-san provides an assessment 
of the direction of legal politics related to the 
relationship between religion and the state in 
Indonesia. In contrast to several previous writings 
which conducted a separate analysis of a number 
of Constitutional Court decisions, this paper will 
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look at the relationship and tendencies of state 
accommodation law politics to religious aspirations 
more comprehensively by using available data. The 
political and legal analysis that the Constitutional 
Court is based on can be misleading one or two 
decisions.
The Constitutional Court Manages Tensions 
on Religion, State and Human Rights
1. Freedom of Religion and Belief
The right to have a religion and belief is one of 
the human rights that is categorized as a right that 
cannot be reduced under any circumstances (non-
derogable rights).12 However, the implementation 
of this right still leaves many problems, both at 
the level of legislation and its implementation. This 
has been a serious problem since the beginning 
of Indonesian independence. The debate over the 
position of religion and the state by the founders 
of this state shows how crucial this issue is. If 
until now there are still a number of laws related 
to religious regulation which have been judicial 
review at the Constitutional Court, it shows that 
the issue of religious, state and human rights 
relations cannot be said to have been completely 
resolved.
1) Adherents and Religion Column on Identity 
Card (KTP)
The Constitutional Court’s decision on judicial 
review of Law no. 23 of 2006 concerning Population 
Administration which has been amended into Law 
no. 24 of 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Ad-
minduk Law) related to the religion column for 
groups of believers of faith is one of the crucial 
decisions. The judicial review submitted by groups 
of believers from various regions submitted 
a request for constitutional interpretation of 
Article 61 paragraph (1), and invalidated Article 
61 paragraph (2) and Pasa 64 paragraph (5) of 
the Adminduk Law.
12 In fulfilling human rights, there are two terms, namely 
derogable and non-derogable rights. Derogable rights are types 
of rights that can be regulated and the fulfillment is postponed 
for various reasons. Meanwhile, non-derogable rights are rights 
whose fulfillment cannot be postponed or deferred. See further 
on Rumadi dkk, Buku Sumber Hak Kebebasan Beragama dan 
Berkeyakinan di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2016), 
pp. 109-142.
Article 61 paragraph (1) states:
“Family Card (KK) contains information 
regarding the KK number column, full name 
of the head of the family and family members, 
NIK, gender, address, place of birth, birth 
date, religion, education, occupation, marital 
status, family relationship status, citizenship, 
immigration documents, parents’ name”.
The Petitioners propose a constitutional 
interpretation so that the word “religion” in the 
article includes belief.
As for Article 61 paragraph (2) and 64 
paragraph (5) regulate the religious ID card column 
and the procedure for filling it out for residents 
whose religion has not been recognized. It is 
this “unrecognized religion” issue that is being 
requested to be canceled.
Based on the request, through decision 
Number 97 / PUU-XIV / 2016, the Constitutional 
Court granted all requests. This decision can be said 
to be an important breakthrough regarding the 
status of believers who have been discriminated 
against.
This decision can be seen as a continuation 
of the Court’s opinion in the previous decision. 
In Decision Number 19 / PUU-VI / 2008, related 
to judicial review of the Law on Religious Courts, 
the Constitutional Court put a view on the 
understanding of the Indonesian state regarding 
the relationship between religion and the State. 
The Constitutional Court emphasized that Indonesia 
is not a religious state based only on one particular 
religion. However, Indonesia is also not a secular 
state which does not pay attention to religion 
at all and leaves religious matters completely to 
individuals and society.
The Constitutional Court further emphasized 
that the right to religion and belief includes the 
right to believe in God Almighty and the right to 
obtain public services. The right to adhere to a 
religion or belief in God Almighty is a constitutional 
right of citizens, not a gift from the State. This 
right stems from the conception of natural rights. 
In a democratic country, the state exists and is 
formed to protect, respect and fulfill these rights 
as referred to in Article 28E paragraph (1) and (2), 
Article 29 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
In relation to Article 28E paragraph (1) and 
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(2) and Article 29 paragraph (2), religion is always 
related to belief, where religion is a belief itself. 
However, according to the Constitutional Court, 
by reading and understanding the existence of 
Article 28E paragraphs (1) and (2) of the 1945 
Constitution, religion and belief are very likely to 
be understood as two different things, and both 
of them are equally recognized for their existence. 
This interpretation of the Constitutional Court 
appears because textually Article 28E paragraph 
(1) talks about “the right to religion and worship 
according to religion”, while Article 28E paragraph 
(2) regulates the right to freedom of belief. The 
Constitutional Court also interprets, by using 
the conjunction “and” in the phrase: “... and to 
worship according to their religion and belief” in 
Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, placing the 
matter of “belief” in proportion to “religion”.13 
By placing the rules of religion and belief in two 
different norms, the 1945 Constitution basically 
also places belief differently from religion.
According to the Constitutional Court, the 
formulation of norms in Article 61 paragraph 
(1) and paragraph (2) as well as Article 64 
paragraph (1) and paragraph (5) of the Population 
Administration Law means that the Law constructs 
the right or freedom to practice religion, which 
actually includes belief in God Who Almighty, as a 
gift from the State. In fact, the right or freedom to 
practice religion (including belief in God Almighty) 
is a right inherent in everyone, because these rights 
are derived from natural rights, not gifts from 
the state. Because the right to have religion and 
belief is one of the most basic human rights, it 
has the consequence of the State’s responsibility 
to ensure that the human rights of its citizens are 
actually enjoyed in practice.14
2) The Blasphemy Law
The blasphemy law in Indonesia is regulated 
in two laws, namely Law no. 1 / PNPS / 1965 
concerning the Prevention of Abuse and / or 
Blasphemy of Religion (hereinafter referred to 
as the Blasphemy Law) and Article 156a of the 
13 See the verdict of Constitutional Court Number 97/
PUU-XIV/2016, pp. 140-141
14 See the verdict of Constitutional Court Number 97/
PUU-XIV/2016, pp. 148-153.
Criminal Code.15 This law is viewed as one of 
the points that fostered intolerance towards 
minority groups after the New Order.16 The Law 
on Blasphemy of Religion was tested twice by 
the Court. The first material test was conducted 
in 2009 a number of activists for freedom of 
religion and belief; and secondly, in 2012, several 
Shiites, Tajul Muluk et al. were “victims” of the 
Blasphemy Law.
In the first judicial review the petitioner argued 
that all articles in the Blasphemy Law were against 
human rights as guaranteed in Article 28 of the 
1945 Constitution. Throughout the trial, in front 
of the Constitutional Court, demonstrations were 
filled with demonstrations from those who refused 
to cancel the law. The parties that submitted the 
judicial review, starting from legal advisors, expert 
witnesses and so on, were subjected to tremendous 
pressure and intimidation.
Through decision No. 140 / PUU-VII / 2009 The 
Constitutional Court rejected all applications. The 
Constitutional Court stated that the Blasphemy 
Law was constitutional. Although the Blasphemy 
Law, drafted in an emergency situation in 1965, 
is still considered relevant, it does not contradict 
the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
believes that if the Blasphemy Law is repealed, 
social chaos will arise because there will be a legal 
vacuum. The Blasphemy Law is also considered to 
have nothing to do with religious freedom, but 
only to the blasphemy of religion. This law provides 
general protection and anticipation of conflicts in 
the midst of society.
The Constitutional Court assessed that the 
Blasphemy Law is formal, providing certainty 
that everyone is prohibited from disseminating 
and recommending interpretations of activities 
that deviate from the main principles of religious 
15 Article 156a of the Criminal Code is a mandate of Article 
4 of Law no. 1 / PNPS / 1965 which states that in the KUHP 
there is a new article, namely Article 156a which reads: “To be 
punished with imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years whoever 
deliberately in public expresses feelings or commits an act: a. 
which are principally hostile, abuse or desecration of a religion 
adhered to in Indonesia; b. with the intention so as not to adhere 
to any religion based on the One Godhead “.
16 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Religious Diversity and Blasphemy 
Law Understanding Growing Religious Conflict and Intolerance 
in Post-Soeharto Indonesia”, al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies, 
vol. 55, no. 1 (2017), pp. 105-126. 
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teachings. The argument of the Constitutional 
Court is not only related to the constitution, but 
also to sociological-political considerations. This 
is evident in the argument of the Constitutional 
Court which states that if this law is repealed there 
will be chaos, unrest, division and public hostility 
because of the vacuum of the law.17
Here, the Constitutional Court interprets 
the precepts of the Supreme Lordship with the 
state’s ability to make legislation to intervene in 
the religious beliefs of its citizens if it is deemed 
that these beliefs are deemed unbelieving in 
one God. This Constitutional Court decision 
provides a legal way for the state to intervene 
in the lives of religious communities not only 
in relation to the external forum, namely areas 
where other parties can intervene, but also the 
forum internum, namely areas where other 
parties should not be able to intervene, based 
on Article 28J. UUD 1945.
Two years after the Constitutional Court issued 
a decision, the Blasphemy Law of the Criminal 
Code was again tested for its constitutionality. 
Different from before. This time, the Blasphemy 
Law and Article 156a of the Criminal Code are 
considered to be contradicting Article 28D of the 
1945 Constitution, which reads: “Everyone has the 
right to recognition, guarantees, protection and 
legal certainty that is just and equal treatment 
before the law”.
Although the applicant for the judicial review 
developed the argument that the Blasphemy Law 
and Article 156a of the Criminal Code contained 
many problems because the norms created 
legal uncertainty, the Constitutional Court still 
rejected the petition. In Decision Number 84 / 
PUU-X / 2012, there is actually no new argument 
from the previous decision. In this decision the 
arguments put forward in decision No. 140 / 
PUU-VII / 2009 that Indonesia as a country that 
adheres to religious beliefs is not separated from 
the state, has a Ministry of Religion that serves 
and protects the growth and development of 
religion.
17 See the verdict of Constitutional Court Number 140/
PUU-VII/2009, p. 287.
3) Application of Islamic Criminal Law through 
Religious Courts
The desire to apply Islamic criminal law was 
one of the central issues since the early days 
of Indonesian independence. Unlike Islamic civil 
law, the Indonesian government does not provide 
enough room for the implementation of Islamic 
penalties. Feeling that the State has not been 
facilitated by the implementation of Islamic criminal 
law, a citizen named Suryani who is located in 
Serang Banten filed a judicial review of the law. 
no. 3 of 2006 concerning Religious Courts.18 He 
challenged Article 49 paragraph (1) where Islamic 
criminal law is not part of the competence of the 
Religious Courts.
According to the Petitioner, Islamic law with all 
of its branches including Islamic criminal law must 
be enforced in Indonesia because Indonesia is a 
country based on One Godhead. For this reason, 
Suryani asked for the revocation of Article 49 
paragraph (1) of the Law on the Religious Courts.19
The Petitioners argued that the implementation 
of Article 49 paragraph (1) has impaired their 
constitutional rights to implement Islamic law. 
Islamic Criminal Law is a unit of Islamic law whose 
implementation must also be facilitated by the 
State. This article is deemed contrary to Article 28E 
paragraph (1), Article 28I paragraph (1) and (2), as 
well as Article 29 paragraph (1) and (2) of the 1945 
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court rejected the petition, 
the arguments presented were considered legally 
groundless. Article 49 paragraph (1) of the Law on 
Religious Courts is declared not to contradict the 
constitution. In Decision No. 19 / PUU-VI / 2008, the 
Constitutional Court stated: first, the Constitutional 
Court has no authority to increase the absolute 
competence of the Religious Courts as stipulated 
in Article 49 paragraph (1) of the Law on Religious 
Courts, because the Constitutional Court only has 
the authority to examine the constitutionality of 
laws and can only act as negative legislators, 
18 Law No. 3 of 2006 is an improvement from Law no. 
7 of 1989 concerning Religious Courts.
19 Article 49 paragraph (1) states that the Religious Courts 
have the authority to examine, to decide and to settle cases 
among Muslims related to marriage, inheritance, wills, grants, 
waqf, grants, sodaqah and sharia economics. 
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not authorized to add regulatory norms (positive 
legislators).
Second, the request to include Islamic criminal 
law in the authority of the Religious Courts is 
not in accordance with the Indonesian state 
understanding of the relationship between the 
state and religion. The Constitutional Court stated 
that Indonesia is not a religious country based 
only on one religion, but Indonesia is also not a 
secular country that does not pay attention to 
religious matters.
Third, the provisions of Article 49 paragraph 
(1) of the Law on Religious Courts in no way reduce 
the Petitioner’s rights and freedom to embrace a 
religion and worship according to his religion as 
guaranteed in Article 28E paragraph (1), Article 
28I paragraph (1) and (2), as well as Article 29 
paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution.
This argument shows the ideological-political 
position of the Constitutional Court regarding 
the position of Islamic criminal law, namely the 
disapproval of the existence of a special criminal 
law for Muslims. This is where the tolerance limit 
for the application of Islamic law through the State. 
This attitude is different from Islamic civil law, 
which has almost all become part of State law.
2. Marriage Law 
1) Polygamy Arrangements
In the Marriage Law, the regulation on 
polygamy is regulated in Article 3 paragraph (1) 
and paragraph (2); Article 4 paragraph (1) and (2); 
Article 5 paragraph (1); Article 9; Article 15; and 
Article 24. The constitutionality of these articles is 
tested by M. Insa, SH, a resident whose address 
is in Bintaro, South Jakarta, because they are 
considered to have taken away the freedom of 
the right to religion and belief, which is guaranteed 
in Article 29 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2). ; 
and also Article 28B paragraph (1); Article 28E 
Paragraph (1); Article 28I paragraph (1) and (2) 
of the 1945 Constitution. These articles of the 
constitution are related to the guarantee of 
human rights to practice religion and belief. For 
the petitioner, polygamy is part of the Islamic 
law and has the value of worship. The Petitioner 
feels aggrieved by the articles in the Marriage Law 
that regulate polygamy. With this arrangement, his 
religious right to worship is lost. Because of that, 
the petitioner asked the Constitutional Court to 
cancel the articles that limit and regulate polygamy.
Article 3 Paragraph (1) and (2) of the Marriage 
Law basically states that a man can only have one 
wife, and a woman can only have one husband. 
However, the court can give permission for a 
husband to have more than one wife if he wants. 
Thus, this article regulates that a husband who 
wants polygamy must obtain permission from 
the court (Article 4 paragraph [1]). The court 
only gives permission if: a) the wife is unable 
to carry out her obligations as wife; b) the wife 
has physical disabilities and incurable diseases; c) 
the wife cannot give birth to offspring (Article 4 
Paragraph 2). In Article 5 Paragraph (1), a number 
of requirements are added to apply to the court, 
namely: a) the consent of the wife; b) assurance 
that husbands can provide for the necessities of 
life of their wives and children; c) guarantee that 
the husband can do justice.
Meanwhile Articles 15 and 24 of the Marriage 
Law regulate those who are still bound by marriage 
to prevent new marriages and are allowed to 
cancel marriages where one of the parties is still 
bound by the other. These provisions are seen 
as an obstacle to the fulfillment of human rights, 
especially in relation to the right to worship and 
practice religion and belief.
The Constitutional Court’s decision is based on 
arguments: first, the provisions governing polygamy 
for citizens whose religious laws allow polygamy 
is reasonable, because marriage is valid according 
to Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the Marriage Law if 
it is carried out in accordance with their religion 
and belief. On the other hand, it is unnatural if 
the Marriage Law regulates polygamy for those 
whose religious laws do not recognize polygamy. 
So this arrangement is not discrimination, because 
in this arrangement nothing is differentiated, but 
rather regulates according to what is needed.
Second, the articles contained in the Marriage 
Law which contain the reasons, conditions and 
procedures for polygamy, are to ensure that 
the rights of wives and prospective wives are 
fulfilled which are the obligations of husbands 
who are polygamous in order to achieve the 
goal of marriage. Thus, this regulation cannot be 
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interpreted as nullifying the provisions that allow 
polygamous marriage.
2) Status of Children Born Out of Legal Marriage
Provisions regarding the legal status of 
children born out of legal wedlock, namely Article 
2 Paragraph (2) and Article 43 Paragraph (1) of 
the Marriage Law were questioned by Machica 
Mochtar (MM), a singing artist, and her son 
Muhammad Iqbal Ramadhan ( MIR). MIR was a 
child from a marriage that was not registered - 
or commonly called a sirri marriage - MM with 
Moerdiono, the Minister of State Secretary during 
the New Order era. However, until Moerdiono died 
in 2011, he never recognized MIR as his son. MIR 
also only has a civil relationship with his mother. 
The norms that MM challenged were Article 2 
Paragraph (2) and Article 43 Paragraph (1) of the 
Marriage Law. MM feels that his constitutional 
rights have been impaired by these articles.
Article 2 Paragraph (2) of the Marriage Law 
states, “Every marriage is recorded according to 
the prevailing laws and regulations”. This Article, 
according to the Petitioner, is detrimental to his 
constitutional rights which have been guaranteed 
in the 1945 Constitution Article 28B Paragraph 
(1) and Paragraph (2), Article 28D Paragraph (1). 
The articles that are used as the touchstone are 
articles that guarantee human rights, especially 
the right to form a family and continue offspring 
through a legal marriage; children also have the 
right to live, grow and develop and have the right 
to protection from violence and discrimination. 
According to the Petitioner, the constitution has 
guaranteed everyone has the right to carry out a 
marriage as long as it is in accordance with their 
religion and belief. In this regard, the applicant has 
carried out a marriage in accordance with Islamic 
religious norms. The norms contained in Article 2 
Paragraph (2), according to the applicant, have 
reduced religious norms, so that the existence 
of a marriage which he undertakes according to 
Islamic law is not recognized because it is not 
recorded. Due to the reduction of religious norms 
by legal norms, not only does the applicant’s 
marital status become unclear, but also results in 
the status of the child resulting from the marriage. 
This is as stated in Article 43 Paragraph (1) of 
the Marriage Law which states that children born 
outside of marriage only have a civil relationship 
with their mother and their mother’s family. 
Based on this article, the applicant’s child only 
has a civil relationship with his mother. This is 
considered unfair because the applicant has 
entered into a marriage that is legal according 
to Islam. In its decision, the Constitutional Court 
accepted some of the requests. In relation to 
Article 2 Paragraph (2) which regulates marriage 
registration, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
petition. This means, the Constitutional Court is 
of the opinion that marriage registration is not 
against the constitution and cannot be viewed as 
a reduction of religious norms by legal norms. By 
citing the General Elucidation of Law no. 1 of 1974, 
the Constitutional Court was of the opinion that 
marriage registration was not a factor determining 
the legal requirements of a marriage. Marriage 
registration is an administrative obligation which 
is required based on statutory regulations. From 
the State side, marriage registration is important 
for upholding the State’s function to guarantee 
the protection, advancement, enforcement and 
fulfillment of human rights. Meanwhile, from the 
community side, marriage is a legal act which has 
implications for the occurrence of broad legal 
consequences. Therefore the State must protect 
and serve the rights arising from this marriage.
In relation to Article 43 Paragraph (1), the 
Constitutional Court stated that this article is 
contrary to the 1945 Constitution as long as it 
is interpreted as eliminating civil relations with 
men which can be proven based on science and 
technology as a biological father. Therefore, Article 
43 Paragraph (2) must be read, “Children born 
outside of marriage have a civil relationship with 
their mother and mother’s family as well as with 
a man as their father which can be proven based 
on science and technology and / or other evidence 
according to law. have a blood relationship, 
including a civil relationship with his father’s family.
The legal issue of the status of children born 
outside of marriage is the legal meaning of the 
phrase “born outside of marriage”. Naturally, it 
is impossible for a woman to become pregnant 
without the meeting between the ovum and 
spermatozoa. Therefore, according to the 
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Constitutional Court, it is neither right nor fair if the 
law stipulates that a child born from a pregnancy 
due to sexual relations outside of marriage only 
has a relationship with his mother. It would be 
unfair if the law freed the man who fertilized and 
caused the child to be born from responsibility 
and negated the rights of the child.
On that basis, the relationship between the 
child and the father is not solely due to the 
existence of a marriage bond, but can also be 
based on evidence of the relationship between the 
child’s blood and the father. Thus, apart from the 
matter of marriage administration, children born 
must receive legal protection. If not, the loser is a 
child born out of wedlock, even though birth was 
not his will. The law must provide just protection 
and certainty for the status of a child.20
3) Marriage with Different Religions 
Four legal consultants in Jakarta, Damien 
Agata Yuvens, Rangga Sujud Widigda, Anbar 
Jayadi, and Luthfi Sahputra submitted a material 
review on religious marriage arrangements. The 
norm being tested is Article 2 Paragraph (1) of 
the Marriage Law which reads: “Marriage is legal 
if it is carried out according to that religion and 
belief”. According to the Petitioner, there are 2 
(two) levels of understanding of this norm, namely: 
1) the validity of marriage which is stipulated by 
national law based on the laws of each religion; 
2) the assessment of the validity of marriage is 
carried out by the respective laws of religion and 
belief. The two levels are basically one unit, where 
religious law has “changed clothes” to become 
State law.
A further implication is that marriages that 
are conducted outside the State’s interpretation 
of each religion are not valid. In other words, 
the State forces every citizen to comply with 
one interpretation adopted by the State for each 
religion / belief. This arrangement, according to 
the petitioner, causes legal uncertainty for people 
intending to get married, which results in violations 
of the religious rights guaranteed through Article 
28B Paragraph (1), Article 28E Paragraph (1 and 2), 
20 See the verdict of Constitutional Court Number 46/
PUU-VIII/2010 especially the opinion of the Court
Article 28I Paragraph (1) and Article 29 Paragraph 
(2) of the 1945 Constitution.
In this regard, the petitioner asked the 
Constitutional Court that the norms in Article 2 
Paragraph (1) of the Marriage Law be declared 
contrary to the 1945 Constitution and do not have 
binding legal force as long as it is not interpreted, 
the interpretation of the law of religion and belief 
is left to the respective prospective bride and 
groom.
The application is divided into two parts, 
namely the reasons for the material test and the 
reasons for the formal test. The reasons for the 
judicial review include, among other things, the 
judgment imposed by the State on its citizens who 
are married through Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the 
Marriage Law. This restriction is considered by the 
applicant to have violated the right to enter into 
a legal marriage and the right to form a family 
as guaranteed in Article 28B Paragraph (1) of the 
1945 Constitution. Norms of Article 2 Paragraph 
(1) are also seen as opening up a very wide space 
for interpretation and causing conflicts between 
norms so that cannot guarantee the fulfillment 
of the right to just legal certainty as regulated in 
Article 28D Paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.
Meanwhile, in a formal manner, the test is 
based on the reasons, the enforcement of Article 
2 Paragraph (2) of the Marriage Law has resulted 
in various smuggling of laws in the marriage 
sector; these norms do not meet the standards 
as statutory regulations; and contrary to its own 
purpose, namely that every marriage be based on 
the laws of each religion and belief.21
The Constitutional Court decided to reject the 
petition in its entirety. The applicant’s petition is 
deemed to have no legal reasons. This means that 
Article 2 Paragraph (1) remains valid and is declared 
not to contradict the constitution, as argued by 
the petitioner. The Constitutional Court’s decision 
is based on several arguments. First, in relation 
to the petitioner’s argument which states that his 
constitutional right to marry and form a family is 
violated by the provision of Article 2 Paragraph 
21 These reasons are described at length in the Principles 
of the Petition as outlined in the Decision Number 68/PUU-
XII/2014, p. 15-58.
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(1), according to the Constitutional Court it is not 
proven. According to the Court, in exercising their 
rights and freedoms, every citizen is obliged to 
comply with the restrictions stipulated by law as 
referred to in Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution.
Second, in relation to the petitioner’s 
arguments, Article 2 Paragraph (1) of the Marriage 
Law forces every citizen to obey the laws of their 
respective religions and beliefs, not things that are 
against the constitution. According to the Court, 
marriage is one of the problem areas regulated in 
the legal system in Indonesia, so that all actions 
and actions taken by citizens must comply with 
statutory regulations.
Third, in relation to the petitioner’s argument 
that argues that the right to freedom of religion is 
violated by the enactment of Article 2 Paragraph (1) 
because it is considered to confuse administrative 
provisions with the implementation of religious 
teachings, dictating religious interpretation, is also 
incorrect. According to the Constitutional Court, 
the State has an interest in ensuring the legal 
certainty of marriage ties. Therefore, marriage 
cannot be seen from the formal aspect only, but 
must be seen from the spiritual and social aspects. 
Religion determines the legality of marriage, while 
the State determines the legality administratif of 
the marriage.22
Negotiating Accommodation Limits
Based on the description in the previous section, 
it appears that the way the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of the constitution and the way of 
looking at the problem is not always the same. 
The verdict on blasphemy of the Constitutional 
Court is very restrictive and takes into account 
aspects outside the constitution, but in judging 
the Marriage Law the Constitutional Court gave 
birth to a conservative tendency. Meanwhile, in 
the Islamic criminal verdict in the Law on Religious 
Courts, the Constitutional Court tends to avoid 
deepening the discourse of religious freedom with 
a formal argument that the Court does not have 
the authority.23
22 Read the Opinion of the Court in the Constitutional 
Court Decision Number 68/PUU-XII/2014, p. 150-153. 
23 Ismail Hasani (editor), Dinamika Perlindungan Hak 
Konstitusional Warga, p. 319.
On that basis, it is understandable if Simon Butt 
concluded that the Constitutional Court’s decision 
related to religious issues seemed ambiguous and 
inconsistent.24 Related to the Religious Courts 
where the Constitutional Court refused to give 
additional authority related to jinayah law on 
the grounds that the criminal law only applies to 
national law; Regarding the issue of polygamy and 
the Religious Courts the Constitutional Court has 
a clear and firm attitude, although it is recognized 
that Islamic law is one of the sources of the 
formulation of national law, its implementation 
through the authority of the State must be limited. 
In fact, with regard to Islamic criminality, although 
some Muslims believe that Islamic punishment is 
part of Islamic teachings, this teaching cannot be 
implemented and becomes state law. If it is related 
to polygamy and the implementation of Islamic 
criminal law, the Constitutional Court appears to 
be more secular by rejecting Islamic criminal law, 
however in cases of blasphemy law and interfaith 
marriage, the Constitutional Court decisions appear 
more religious and tend to be accommodative and 
defend religious interests.
This ruling shows that there is a negotiation 
on the limits of accommodation of religious law 
(Islam) in state law. Insofar as it is related to 
Islamic criminal matters, the Constitutional Court 
has made a kind of limit of accommodation of 
state law politics against religious law (Islam). With 
this perspective, the Constitutional Court tends 
to close the door on the possibility of a criminal 
law that specifically applies to Muslims nationally, 
let alone add the competence of the Religious 
Courts, although on a limited scale Islamic criminal 
law can be applied as in Aceh25 because of its 
specificity.26 The struggle for Islamic criminal law is 
not in making criminal law that applies exclusively 
to Muslims, but rather on legal politics including 
24 Simon Butt, “Between Control and Appeasement: 
Religion in Five Constitutional Court Decisions” in Tim Lindsey 
and Helen Pausacker (ed.), Religion, Law and Intolerance in 
Indonesia, (London: Rouledge, 2016), pp. 60-61.
25 Aceh Qanun Number 6 of 2014 concerning Law of 
Jinayat and Qanun Number 7 of 2013 concerning Law of Jinayat 
Procedure.
26 Aceh’s specificity in implementing Islamic law is 
contained in Law no. 18 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy 
for the Province of the Special Region of Aceh as Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam.
Rumadi: Religion, State and Human Rights
131 |
aspects of Islamic crime in the national Criminal 
Code (KUHP).
Thus, there is no doubt about the existence 
of an exclusive Islamic criminal law as a ladder to 
become an Islamic state. The transformation of 
Islamic law into statutory regulations, especially 
related to criminal law, is more of a process of 
“Indonesianization” of criminal law, rather than the 
Islamization of national criminal law.27 This at the 
same time refutes the argument that the process of 
transforming Islamic law into statutory regulations 
is a ladder to an Islamic state.28 According to 
Arskal Salim, the process of transforming Islamic 
law is carried out through five levels which run 
hierarchically. First, Islamic law applies to areas of 
family law such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
Second, Islamic law applies to the economic and 
financial sectors such as Islamic banking and zakat. 
Third, Islamic law applies to religious ritual practices 
such as the obligation to wear the hijab for women 
or the legal prohibition of things that are contrary 
to Islamic teachings such as alcohol and gambling. 
Fourth, Islamic law also applies to the application 
of Islamic criminal law, especially with regard to 
the types of sanctions imposed on violators. Fifth, 
the use of Islam as the basis of the state and its 
government system.
From a hierarchical perspective, the higher 
the demands for the application of Islamic law, 
the closer to the Islamic state. With the same 
narrative, the 25th edition of the Weekly Gatra 
Magazine in May 2006 made a cover story entitled: 
“Negeri Syariah Is Just One Step”. In this edition, 
it was reported that various movements made 
regulations with the nuances of Islamic law, both at 
regional and national levels, had brought Indonesia 
closer to becoming an Islamic state. However, after 
approximately fourteen years this concern was not 
proven. Even the spirit of implementing Islamic 
law in various regions can be said to be stagnant, 
if not said to have disappeared. Thus, the author 
27 Read Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State, The 
Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia, (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai Press, 2009), p. 177.
28 Arskal Salim, “Penerapan Syariat Islam Bukan Negara 
Islam?”, published on http://islamlib.com/kajian/fikih/penerapan-
syariat-bukan-negara-islam/ on 23 March 2020. see Arskal Salim 
and Azyumardi Azra (Editor), Sharia and Politics in Modern 
Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
agrees with Abdul Halim,29 who is of the opinion 
that the accommodation of Islamic law in national 
law does not necessarily bring Indonesia closer to 
an Islamic state because it is done within the legal 
framework and commitment to the Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila 
and the 1945 Constitution.
In contrast to Islamic criminal law where 
the Constitutional Court has clear negotiation 
boundaries, in the field of Islamic civil law, especially 
Islamic family law, there is no clear accommodation 
limit. Islamic civil law is not only fully accommodated 
in legal politics in Indonesia, but also confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court. Religious aspirations that 
tended to be conservative, such as the prohibition 
of interfaith marriage, polygamy and the age limit 
of marriage were strengthened by the Court.30 This 
conservatism can be understood as a reflection of 
the attitude of the religious community in general. 
Reform of the marriage law will always get strong 
reactions from religious circles. Because of this, the 
reform of the marriage law was limited.
The Constitutional Court’s decision regarding 
family law which is quite progressive is only related 
to the status of children born outside of legal 
marriages. This has also received a strong reaction 
from Islamic circles who are considered permissive, 
even considered “legalizing” adultery. Chairman of 
the MUI, KH. Ma’ruf Amin said that the verdict was 
overdose and exceeded the limit and equated the 
child from adultery with the child born from a legal 
marriage.31 The General Chairperson of Muslimat 
NU, Khofifah Indarparawansa also commented 
that the Constitutional Court’s decision could be 
problematic.32
29 Abdul Halim, “Membangun Teori Politik Hukum Islam 
di Indonesia”, Jurnal Ahkam, vol. XIII, no. 2 Juli (2013). 
30 Constitutional Court decision number 30-74/PUU-XII/2014
31iiiSeeiiihttps://news.detik.com/berita/d-1866192/mui-nilai-
keputusan-mk-soal-status-anak-di-luar-nikah-overdosis tertanggal 
13 Maret 2012. Respond to the comments above, The Chief Justice 
of the Constitutional Court who decided the case, Mahfudh MD, 
commented that MUI did not understand the concept of law and 
rejected the Court’s view of legalizing adultery. see https://news.
detik.com/berita/d-1879155/soal-putusan-status-anak-di-luar-nikah-
ketua-mk-nilai-mui-tak-paham, on 28 March 2012. To reduce the 
various negative responses, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court Mahfudh MD visited various Islamic boarding schools to 
explain the Constitutional Court’s decision.
32i i ihttps://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/
umum/12/02/26/lzzyhr-muslimat-nu-putusan-mk-soal-anak-luar-
nikah-bisa-menjerumuskan, on February 26, 2012.
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As explained in the previous section, the 
Constitutional Court Decision states Article 43 
paragraph (1) of Law no. 1 of 1974 concerning 
Marriage is considered unconstitutional and has no 
legal force if it removes the civil relationship with 
the biological father. So far, children born outside 
of legal marriages do not have any relationship 
with their biological father, even though their 
parents feel that they have entered into a legal 
marriage according to Islamic law (nikah sirri), 
even though it is not registered in the State 
administration. Thus, this Constitutional Court 
Ruling, on the one hand is quite progressive 
in terms of protecting children’s rights, but on 
the other hand, this decision can be a means of 
protecting unregistered marriages.33 However, the 
Constitutional Court refused if this decision was 
considered legal for adultery. The Constitutional 
Court’s decision is clearly not related to the act 
of adultery, an act which is clearly prohibited by 
religion, but focuses on the rights of the born child. 
From this perspective, the Constitutional Court’s 
decision is quite courageous amidst conservatism 
in Indonesia that continues to strengthen.34 The 
Constitutional Court dared to move out of the 
rigidity of legal positivism towards more substantial 
protection of human rights.35
Likewise with the decision regarding the 
religion column in the KTP for worshipers. This 
decision can be said to be a very important 
breakthrough in managing the relationship 
between religion and the State, especially for 
religious believers who so far feel that they are 
not fully recognized as citizens.36 They are always 
seen as “the other” who have no religion, and 
some even consider them a heretical group. The 
existence of a political confession of religion, 
33 Positive and negative impacts of the Constitutional Court 
Decision, read Busman Edyar, “Status Anak Luar NikahMenurut 
Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam Pasca Keluarnya Putusan MK 
Tentang Uji Materiil Undang Undang Perkawinan”, al-Istinbath 
Jurnal Hukum Islam, vol. 1, no. 2 (2016), pp. 181-208
34 Regarding the strengthening of conservatism, read 
Martin van Bruinessen (Ed.), Contemporary Developments in 
Indonesian Islam, (Singapore, ISEAS, 2013).
35 See Habib Shulton Asnawi, “Politik Hukum Putusan MK 
No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010 tentang Status Anak di Luar Nikah: Upaya 
Membongkar Positivisme Hukum menuju Perlindungan HAM” 
dalam Jurnal Konstitusi, vol.10 no. 2 Juni (2013).
36 Based on the records of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture in 2017, there were 187 communities of Beliefs.
keeps them excluded. With the Constitutional 
Court ruling, the state’s service to worshipers 
was getting better. In addition to being able to 
list as believers in the KTP religion column, the 
children of the devotees receive a guarantee of 
religious education in schools through the Minister 
of Education and Culture Regulation Number 27 
of 2016 concerning Education Services to God 
Almighty in the Education Unit.
This shows that the position of religion in all 
its aspects within the State of Indonesia will always 
be an arena for contestation.37 In this contestation, 
Indonesian legal politics through the Constitutional 
Court continued to apply the principle of limiting the 
implementation of religious teachings. In the case 
of polygamy, the Constitutional Court confirmed 
the limitation of polygamy through administrative 
regulations. Likewise, the Constitutional Court’s 
decision which strengthens the Law on Religious 
Courts which only resolves matters of marriage, 
inheritance, waqf and sharia economic disputes, 
does not include Islamic penalties, showing that 
there are such restrictions. However, in relation to 
the regulation on blasphemy and the prohibition 
of interfaith marriage, the Constitutional Court 
actually reinforced religious views. There is no 
definite formula for which aspects of religion 
can be included in State regulations, and which 
are not allowed, except for the impossibility of 
the existence of Islamic criminal law that applies 
specifically to Muslims. This will always create 
contestation between the various socio-political 
forces and the political direction of Indonesian 
law. The implication is that the contestation and 
negotiation of the State, religion and Human Rights 
will continue to occur in the future, especially 
efforts to influence the national criminal law by 
incorporating aspects of Islamic criminal law.38 
The limits of state accommodation on religious 
aspirations will continue to be contested. Although 
there will be more and more religious aspects 
accommodated in the laws and regulations, this 
does not necessarily lead to Indonesia becoming 
37 Read Simon Butt, “Islam, the State and the Constitutional 
Court in Indonesia”, in Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, (2010), 
pp. 279-301.
38 Read Simon Butt, “Islam, the State and the Constitutional 
Court in Indonesia”, in Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, (2010), 
p. 279-301.
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Based on this description, it can be concluded 
that the issue of the relation between religion 
and state in Indonesia is an open space that will 
continue to contest. Religious aspirations will 
continue to be pushed into state regulations, 
both through the process of formulating 
statutory regulations, as well as judicial reviews 
in the Constitutional Court. The contestation 
can take place in society, in the parliamentary 
room or in the court room. Judicial review of a 
number of laws related to religious issues in the 
Constitutional Court is a space for contestation as 
well as negotiating various constitutional interests 
that are disturbed by the law. The Constitutional 
Court as the guardian of the constitution whose 
decisions are final and binding will give direction 
to how religious issues are put in the statutory 
legal system. This is the space for contestation 
and negotiation of various constitutional interests.
The study above shows that basically the 
Constitutional Court is accommodating with 
religious regulations even though there is a 
maximum limit, namely the accommodation 
of Islamic criminal law which is exclusive to 
Muslims. Regarding Islamic private-civil law, the 
Constitutional Court is very accommodating, 
tends to be conservative even though there are 
limited reforms. The Constitutional Court’s decision 
regarding the status of children born out of legal 
wedlock is a form of this limited renewal. Although 
the verdict regarding the blasphemy offense can 
be said to be conservative, the status of followers 
of the Belief in God Almighty is an important legal 
breakthrough to eradicate discrimination based on 
religion and belief.
With this fact, there are at least two 
important things related to state accommodation 
towards religious regulations, especially Islam. 
First, with regard to Islamic private or civil law, 
the Constitutional Court opened a fairly wide 
accommodation space, so that more religious 
aspects would be accommodated by the state 
even with limited reform. Therefore, the theory 
of state accommodation towards religion needs a 
more detailed explanation, because many countries 
accommodate religious aspirations, but the level 
of accommodation varies. Even though it is not a 
religious state, the level of accommodation towards 
religion has deepened, although this cannot be 
interpreted by Indonesia as becoming a religious 
state. Second, the limit of accommodation is Islamic 
criminal law which cannot be made exclusively 
for Muslims even though it is possible in Islamic 
civil law. The accommodation of Islamic criminal 
law is only possible if the norms are incorporated 
into the national criminal law through a process 
of rational objectification.
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